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To recommend an OSI position with respect to Project [REDACTED]

BACKGROUND

1. In 1949 and 1950 it became clear that broadcasts by the Voice of America to the Soviet Bloc were being jammed increasingly and systematically. The concern aroused by this Soviet activity led to the establishment by CIA (in accordance with NSC 66/1) of a pilot operation to determine if it would be possible to obtain information by technical means regarding Soviet jamming activities. The increasing concern felt regarding the impact of jamming upon US international broadcasting led to NSC 169, which assigned to CIA certain responsibilities for evaluating technical effectiveness of such broadcasting and directed that the pilot operation [REDACTED] be carried forward by CIA. Project [REDACTED] conducted by the Office of Communications, collected through monitoring and direction finding operations a considerable body of information regarding the scope, location, and method of operation of Soviet jammers working against US international broadcasting. In October 1954 the NSC amended NSC 169 to direct the Department of Defense to plan for an operation which would replace Project Advancer.

2. In December 1955 the Department of Defense issued a directive, subject, Soviet Jamming Potential, assigning to the Secretary of the Air Force, under the authority for ELINT, responsibility for directing and supervising the monitoring and evaluating operations for the detection of significant new or unusual developments in the Soviet jamming system. Accordingly, the Department of the Air Force developed an operational plan for Soviet Bloc jammer monitoring in which the Army Security Agency, Naval Security Group, USAF Security Services, and NIPC would participate. In brief, this plan set up four combination intercept and DF facilities: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Reports from these stations were to be analyzed by NIPC which would in turn disseminate to interested agencies the results of these analyses. Project [REDACTED] operates today essentially in this manner.

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required for [REDACTED] is completely different from that required for ELINT activities. Personnel adequately trained to conduct ELINT operations are not, as a result of such training, competent to perform [REDACTED] activities. In several

[REDACTED]

(c) The DF equipment assigned to Project [REDACTED] is 25X1A2g essentially the same as was used prior to World War II. In some cases it is poorly sited. One station in fact, has never received its equipment. No attempt has been made to utilize more advanced techniques for direction finding that have been developed since World War II. The flash network linking DF stations together is not yet fully in operation, which prevents the full use of that technical capability 25X1A2g might exist in the system as a whole.

[REDACTED]

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

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5. There are several possible means by which [REDACTED] might be made a more useful source of information on Soviet jamming activities.

(a) Conceivably the project could be permitted to remain as a part of ELINT. Such a solution, however, would merely perpetuate the present unsatisfactory situation. Indeed, the reasons for assigning [REDACTED] to ELINT in the first place seem to have been semantic rather than substantive or technical. ELINT by definition is concerned with "non-communications electronic radiations", jamming is obviously

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non-communications, and therefore becomes part of ELINT. The definition of ELINT is already becoming meaningless in other respects, i.e., telemetry and data transmission, and clearly does not provide an adequate basis for the assignment of [REDACTED] 25X1A2g

(b) The activity could be returned to CIA and continued along the lines of the previous Project [REDACTED] 25X1A2g There is no question that this solution would be strenuously resisted by the Office of Communications and would create serious budgetary problems.

(c) It might be assigned to one of the individual military services as an individual service project. Such a solution might clarify command and reporting channels. However, it would require the reconstitution of the present [REDACTED] 25X1A2g  
[REDACTED] 25X1A2g

(d) The activity might be transferred to NSA. This solution would have one important advantage: it would ensure that the field operation was carried on by personnel experienced and competent. In some respects it would fit in well with the EW work which NSA necessarily performs at present. Command and reporting relationships would be clear-cut. This solution, however, would have the disadvantage of placing information on Soviet jamming within the security framework of COMINT and might deny such information to agencies which have a need or use for it. An additional difficulty might be created within NSA since Project [REDACTED] 25X1A2g is an extremely small activity as compared with the basic NSA function and would tend to become lost in the vast bulk of other operations.

(e) Consideration should also be given to complete abandonment of Project [REDACTED] 25X1A2g An important factor in the sequence of events leading to the project was the fear that the Soviet effort to jam international broadcasting represented a potential that could be, and might in fact be organized with other ultimate purposes in view, such as systematic screening of Soviet communications, concealment of new communications techniques, or for war time or surprise use in jamming vital

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US military communications. The intelligence which has now been gathered on the Soviet jamming activity indicates that it is subject to the over-all direction of the Security Police, and is technically operated by Communications personnel. There is no real evidence of any organic connection between the jamming system and military communications activities. The capabilities of the physical assets of the jamming system, if they should be put to other uses, are reasonably well understood. The effects of Soviet jamming on the reception of US broadcasts can be, and currently are, assessed on the basis of reports from peripheral monitors.

Although there is relatively little information available on Far Eastern jamming activities, the importance of this gap in information does not warrant the transfer of activities to the Far East. Thus it would appear that there is no real need at present which requires the services of this relatively expensive project.

(c) Two other aspects of Project [redacted] deserve further consideration, although their ramifications are beyond the scope of this memorandum.

1) Project [redacted] is in reality concerned with but one part of a much larger problem - that of intelligence on Soviet capabilities for interfering with all types of US electromagnetic emissions, i.e., their capability for countermeasures. [redacted] is concerned with Soviet countermeasures against one particular use made by the US of the electromagnetic spectrum. This relation of [redacted] to other types of countermeasures intelligence was recognized by JCS in its memorandum of 11 October 1955, advising the Secretary of Defense that the problem of Soviet jamming was considered to be one facet of electronics countermeasures in which the Military Services have primary interest. It is understood that relatively little attention has been given by the intelligence community to the subject of countermeasures, despite its importance, since the publication of [redacted] in 1953. Conceivably the resources of Project [redacted] could be used as the basis for an augmented collection effort designed to obtain information in this field on which realistic estimates could be based and counter-countermeasures devised.

2) In contrast to the Soviets, who enjoy the use of an extensive and closely coordinated direction finding network, US facilities for d/f outside the continental United States are scattered, limited in capability,

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and poorly coordinated. Various government agencies have established 4/T facilities for meeting their own requirements in different areas of the world. Each requirements usually relate to immediate tactical needs of the Agency concerned, and there is apparently little or no coordination or mutual support between agencies in the use of these facilities. Other agencies, having requirements from time to time, do not have facilities of their own. There is no central "clearing house" for accepting requirements for 4/T information or coordinating 4/T activities. There exists a variety of needs for 4/T information; the following are merely examples:

- a) To determine the origin of increased jamming of broadcasts in the Near East.
- b) To determine the location of stations broadcasting "black" or "gray" propaganda, and other clandestine broadcast stations.
- c) To locate stations interfering with US communications services, or improperly using portions of the radio spectrum.
- d) To locate the source of unidentified signals.
- e) Identify and locate Soviet earth satellites.

Project [REDACTED] under appropriate administration and direction, might be expanded and provide both a focal point and a valuable supplement to the present independently operated US 4/T facilities. It should be noted that the presently existing 4/T facilities are using essentially World War II equipment and techniques, and that the independence and limited functions of each separate agency system has undoubtedly contributed to the failure to utilize techniques and methods more recently developed.

CONCLUSIONS

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- a. Project [REDACTED] cannot function effectively as a part of ELINT, and should be removed therefrom.
- b. Considered solely as a source of information on jamming of US international broadcasting, the value of [REDACTED] (assuming effective operation) does not justify its continuation.

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Before disposition of Project [REDACTED] consideration  
be given to

1. developing a realistic intelligence program  
with respect to Soviet electronic countermeasures, of which  
[REDACTED] could become a part,

2. developing a coordinated world-wide U.S. <sup>25X1A2g</sup> C/I system  
which would, inter alia, use the facilities of [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]  
Deputy Chief, Collection Staff/SI

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